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  Este artículo estudia el problema de incentivos que surge entre los dueños de una empresa y el 
ejecutivo que la dirige, fruto de la imposibilidad de observar directamente las acciones del directivo. El 
modelo difiere del modelo estándar en la literatura en dos puntos clave. En primer lugar, tiene en cuenta 
que las acciones que toma el directivo tienen un efecto persistente en el tiempo; esta persistencia no la 
consideran los modelos estándar de riesgo moral repetido. En segundo lugar, el efecto del esfuerzo del 
directivo en el precio de las acciones de la empresa se deriva de los primitivos del modelo: el esfuerzo 
determina la distribución de probabilidad de los beneficios de la empresa, y no directamente la 
distribución de precios. Los compradores en el mercado de valores determinan el precio de las acciones 
basándose en la información disponible sobre los beneficios pasados. El artículo presenta, como marco de 
referencia, una caracterización del contrato óptimo asumiendo responsabilidad limitada por parte del 
directivo. Para el caso en que se pueden emitir múltiples paquetes de opciones, se presentan condiciones 
suficientes para la implementación del contrato óptimo. Para un caso simplificado en el que la 
compensación se realiza con un solo paquete de opciones, se analizan las características del mismo. Los 
resultados del análisis indican que la fecha de ejercicio óptima se determina balanceando los beneficios y 
los costes de esperar un periodo más: por un lado, aumenta la calidad de información; por el otro, 
aumenta el coste de proveer incentivos, por tener que estar estos concentrados en un horizonte temporal 
menor. El número de opciones en el paquete, el salario, y especialmente el precio de ejercicio se usan 
para explotar la correlación entre los cambios en precios y los cocientes de probabilidad relativa 
correspondientes a las historias de beneficios que generan esos precios. Por ejemplo, cuando los precios 
bajos están débilmente correlacionados con los correspondientes cocientes, el paquete óptimo de opciones 
tiene un precio de ejercicio positivo, que permite explotar la correlación existente en el rango de precios 
alto mejor que un paquete que incluyera simplemente acciones (i.e, acciones de venta restringida). Estos 
resultados sugieren cautela a la hora de aprobar regulación que pueda distorsionar la elección de los 
precios de ejercicio de las opciones en los paquetes de compensación de directivos de empresa.  




  We study the incentive problem between the owners of a firm and its CEO’s due to the 
unobservability of the manager’s actions. Our model departs from the literature in two ways. First, we 
acknowledge that, in contrast with standard repeated moral hazard models, actions taken by CEO’s have a 
persistent effect in time. Second, we derive the effect of effort on stock prices from primitives; i.e., effort 
affects directly the conditional distribution of profits, and not the distribution of prices. The stock market 
determines the price of the stock of the firm using information about past profits. A complete 
characterization of the Second Best contract assuming limited liability is given as a benchmark. Allowing 
for an arbitrary number of option grants to be awarded, sufficient conditions are given for the 
implementation of the Second Best contract by an Options Scheme. For a stylized scheme with a unique 
option grant, the characteristics of the solution are analyzed. We find that the optimal time of exercise 
balances the increase in quality of information of waiting one extra period with the cost of the poorer 
smoothing of incentives of doing so. The number of options in the grant, the constant wage, and 
especially the exercise price are used to best exploit the correlation between the changes in prices and in 
the likelihood ratios of the histories of profits generating them. As an example, whenever low prices are 
poorly correlated with the likelihood ratios, the optimal option scheme implies a positive exercise price, 
which allows for a better use of a higher correlation over the high stock price range than a simple 
restricted stock scheme. Our results suggest caution regarding regulations that influence the setting of 
exercise prices.   
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  21I n t r o d u c t i o n
Compensation of chief executive oﬃcers (CEOs) with stock options is a widely spread practice
nowadays. The purpose of this paper is to study the implications that the persistent nature of
actions taken by a CEO has for the main characteristics of compensation packages that include stock
options.
It is generally accepted that delegating the management of the ﬁrm to a CEO creates an agency
problem, since, absent the right incentives, CEOs could base their decisions on short term or personal
objectives, which imply immediate reward, rather than trying to serve the interests of the stock
holders by increasing the long term value of the ﬁrm. Granting options and restricted stock is
considered a simple and convenient way of aligning the objective of CEOs with that of the stock
holders. Indeed, in recent years options have become a very important portion of the total pay of
the CEO, along with restricted stock grants.1 Tax advantages associated with performance related
pay and especial accounting treatment for options granted at the money (with exercise price equal
to the market price of the stock at the time of granting) make at the money options particularly
attractive for ﬁrms. This paper presents a new model of the agency problem between the CEO
and the owners of the ﬁrm which takes into account the persistent nature of actions taken by the
CEO. It explicitly models the eﬀect of the manager’s actions on long term proﬁts, providing a formal
framework for determining his long term compensation. In this context, we explore the implied form
of compensation packages that approximate the optimal contract, given that they can include stock
options. The analysis is a ﬁrst step in studying the potential eﬀects of tax incentives and recent
changes in disclosure and accounting rules.
The model in this paper diﬀers from the standard moral hazard models used in the literature in
two ways. First, it acknowledges that the actions that CEOs are asked to exert are persistent: they
aﬀect the proﬁto ft h eﬁrm for many periods after they are implemented. Examples of the kinds of
actions that we are modeling include decisions over mergers, investment in alternative technologies,
the downsizing or expansion of the ﬁrm, and hiring of new personnel, etc. The eﬀect of any such
action taken by the manager of the ﬁrm is persistent, since the decisions are diﬃcult to reverse
immediately, and will determine the company’s proﬁts for several periods afterwards. Following
1As documented in Murphy (1999), in the mid 90’s stock options represented 17 to 36% of total executive com-
pensation. Bonuses represented 19 to 26% of compensation, while the base salary proportion ranged from 21 to 40%.
Restricting the sample to companies with sales above the median, options amounted to 39% of the total compensation,
while salary was 24%. In Jensen and Murphy (2004) numbers are provided up to 2002: the proportion of total pay
represented by options valued at the time of granting reached a pick of 54% in 2000, decreasing to a sizeable 47% in
2002. Both data sets include all companies in the S&P 500, based on ExecuComp data.
2Hopenhayn and Jarque (2007), persistence is modelled in this paper as follows: the CEO takes
a single action at the beginning of the contractual relationship, which determines the conditional
distribution of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt in each of the following periods, until the end of the contract.
The second departure from the literature is that the eﬀect of the manager’s action on the prob-
ability distribution over the ﬁrm’s stock prices is not assumed directly, but is derived from a more
fundamental structure: eﬀort aﬀects the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, and the stock market rationally determines
prices based on the history of proﬁts.
For our analysis, we proceed in two steps. First, assuming an unlimited set of compensation
instruments, we study how the persistence of the actions taken by the CEO changes the properties
of the optimal contract, i.e. we characterize the sequence of wages contingent on observed proﬁt
that induces high eﬀort from the CEO at the minimum cost to the ﬁrm. The characterization of
the optimal contract highlights the role of information gathering over time: variation in wages is
postponed until later periods of the contract, when more information is available.
Second, using our model of stock prices we study how the relationship between proﬁt announce-
ments and prices determines the characteristics of an option-like (limited instruments) optimal com-
pensation package. Our simple model of the stock market aims at illustrating explicitly the eﬀect
of the manager’s action on the stock price of the ﬁrm. The probability distribution over proﬁts is
aﬀected by both the eﬀort of the manager and the quality of the ﬁrm’s technology. This quality
is an unknown parameter to the board, the manager and the stock market. The assumption that
the manager does not know nor can he control the quality of the ﬁrm implies that the optimal
contract would provide insurance against low proﬁts if it were known that they are due to a bad
quality realization. Buyers in the stock market price a share of the ﬁrm at the expected stream of
future proﬁts. In order to calculate this expectation, they incorporate all past public information.
More precisely, they use the history of proﬁt realizations to update their priors over the technology
parameter. They also understand that the ﬁrm provides the right incentives to the manager, and
hence they correctly condition their beliefs on the equilibrium action taken by the CEO. Given this,
any variation in the price of the stock comes from learning about the quality of the ﬁrm’s technology,
and not from learning about the action taken by the manager. However, in the presence of learning,
an oﬀ the equilibrium path change in the eﬀort of the manager (shirking) will aﬀect the market’s
posterior about the ﬁrm’s type, and thus it will decrease its market value. Payment schemes that
include options exploit the indirect eﬀect that low eﬀort has on the price of the ﬁrm: lower eﬀort
increases the probability of poor outcomes; the market interprets these as a sign of a bad quality
ﬁrm and this lowers the stock price, decreasing the manager’s proﬁts from selling the stock options.
In this context and with the optimal contract in mind we try to derive implications for the
3structure of compensation packages that include option grants. Allowing for an arbitrary set of
option grants, we provide suﬃcient conditions for the compensation package to implement exactly
the optimal contract. In doing so, we stress the asymmetry between the stock prices movements and
the desired sensibility of pay for proper incentives. Since the Board is relying on exogenous variation
of prices to set the wage of the CEO, the richness in the compensation instruments is key for providing
the right mix of incentives and insurance. Real life compensation packages use a fairly reduced set
of instruments. Firms provide simple schemes with few at the money option grants, only very rarely
using indexed exercise prices or price contingent vesting times. Tax and accountancy advantages
presumably stand behind this uniformity in compensation practices. Are these advantages distorting
the provision of incentives? When using stock options to provide incentives, is the exercise price
a redundant instrument? We try to address this question by analyzing a one option grant model.
We show how the vesting time, the number of options in the grant and especially the exercise price
are used to best exploit the correlation between stock prices and likelihood ratios of proﬁts. The
learning process about the quality of the ﬁrm determines the stock price for each history of proﬁt
realizations: it implies a certain sensitivity of stock prices to proﬁts. Granting at the money options,
which set the exercise price equal to the stock price at the time of granting, implies arbitrarily setting
the sensitivity of compensation to prices. Using the full range of possible exercise prices, instead,
allows to transform the market—given sensitivity of prices into the sensitivity of compensation in the
optimal contract. In other words, the exercise price is used to best exploit the correlation between
the changes in prices and in the likelihood ratios of the histories of proﬁts generating them. As an
example, whenever low prices are poorly correlated with the likelihood ratios, the optimal option
scheme implies a positive exercise price; this allows for a better use of a higher correlation over the
high stock price range than a simple restricted stock scheme. Hence, we ﬁnd a big range of variation
in optimal exercise prices, from simple restricted stock to in the money options, depending on the
parameter values. We complete the analysis by characterizing, in a two period model, the optimal
compensation package including wages and an unrestricted number of option grants. We provide
examples in which the ﬁrms’ characteristics inﬂuence strongly the structureo fe x e r c i s ep r i c e s .O u r
results suggest caution regarding regulations that inﬂuence the setting of exercise prices.
1.1 Related Literature
In addition to the empirical literature on CEO compensation (see Yermak (1995), Kole (1997), Jensen
and Murphy (1990) and ﬁnally Murphy (1999) for a nice review), some papers have lately looked
at the problem from a contract theory perspective. Clementi, Cooley and Wang (2006) propose a
justiﬁcation of the use of stock options as a commitment device that increases eﬃciency, in a context
4of repeated moral hazard. Wang (1997) calibrates a repeated moral hazard model to gives some
quantitative results on sensibility of CEO pay, using standard contingent consumption contracts
that do not include options.
Some studies have explicitly focused on the form that real life compensation packages should take
as part of an optimal contract. Aseﬀ and Santos (2005) study CEO compensation through options
schemes, in a one period setup — thus, with no persistence of eﬀort. Kadan and Swinkles (2008)
compare options with restricted stocks in a dynamic model in which the CEO can choose to hedge
against the risk in his compensation. They show that stocks dominate options for forms with higher
risk of bankruptcy, and they provide some empirical evidence that supports their result.
All the above mentioned papers assume a certain distribution of prices of the ﬁrm contingent
on the eﬀort choice, as opposed to assuming an induced distribution over output and then letting
the market price the stock, as it is modeled in the present paper. This reduced form allows them
to study the spanning possibilities of an exogenously given distribution of prices, but not to explore
the endogenous determination of those possibilities, as we do in this paper. Holmström and Tirole
(1993) do present a model in which prices are endogenously set. They assume the existence of
stock traders with diﬀerent levels of information and liquidity needs. They characterize the optimal
contract including options in a three period model. The manager decides at the initial period how
much eﬀort he devotes to both short and long term activities, but these two eﬀorts are set separately,
unlike in our framework. Despite this, the eﬀect of eﬀort combined with the signal extraction implies
the optimality of granting shares and stock appreciation rights in their linear compensation contract.
They provide results on how the concentration of ownership and the liquidity of the market inﬂuence
the monitoring value of stock prices. Recently, Bolton, Sheinkman and Xiong (2006) build on this
model to argue that the possibility of speculative movements in prices may rend optimal to construct
option packages that emphasize short term stock performance.
Hall and Murphy (2000) study the setting of optimal exercise prices, also motivated by the
seemingly puzzling uniformity in real life option grants. Using a certainty equivalent approach, they
provide a computational model to evaluate options from the point of view of risk averse managers, as
opposed to the standard Black and Scholes valuation that assumes risk neutrality. For an arbitrary
set of grant values, their numerical exercise ﬁnds that the market price at the time of the grant is
usually included in the range of exercise prices optimal for the provision of incentives. They conclude
that granting options at the money is not generally harming for ﬁrms. Their analysis, however, is
done ignoring the eﬀects that the eﬀort of the manager would have, on and oﬀ the equilibrium, on
the value of the ﬁrm, and hence on the value of the option both for the ﬁrm and for the manager.
The paper is organized as follows: the model is introduced in the ﬁrst section. The optimal
5contract with unrestricted compensation instruments is analyzed in section 3. Section 4 introduces
the payment scheme including options; a One Option Grant scheme is analyzed in detail and some
numerical examples are provided. A two period example of an exact implementation of the Second
Best through stock options is derived in the last subsection. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We model the moral hazard problem between the owners of a ﬁrm and the CEO of the company.
The stockholders of the ﬁrm, acting as a unique risk neutral principal, delegate the design of the
contract to the board of directors.2 The manager is assumed to be risk averse, with a strictly concave
utility function u(·) with u0 (0) = ∞. He has an outside opportunity with an expected utility of U at
period zero. The contract lasts for an exogenously determined number of periods T,a f t e rw h i c ht h e
eﬀort of the CEO does not aﬀect the proﬁto ft h eﬁrm. In any period, proﬁts can take two values,
yL =0 , and yH =1 . Both the manager’s eﬀort level e, and the quality of the technology of the ﬁrm
θ, aﬀect the probability of the outcome. Eﬀort can take two values, eL and eH,(with eL <e H)w h i c h
also stand for the manager’s disutility of eﬀort. We assume that the parameters are such that the
ﬁrm owners always want to implement eH. The ﬁrm type θ can be “good” (G), or “bad” (B). Both
the owners and the CEO have the same prior q0 of θ = G. New observations are used to update this
prior according to Bayes’ rule. The posteriors are denoted q
¡
yt¢





For a given quality of the ﬁrm and a given eﬀort of the CEO, the probabilities of high proﬁts are:
G B
eL ˆ πG ˆ πB
eH πG πB
We assume that 0 < πθ < 1 and 0 < ˆ πθ < 1 for both θ = G,B. Fig. ?? illustrates the timing of
the game and the actual probabilities driving output realizations. First, nature (N) decides the type
of the ﬁrm. Second, the manager (M), without knowing the realization of the type, chooses between
the high and the low levels of eﬀort. This determines the probability for each history of outputs to
follow. The CEO, the board and the stock market all calculate the ex ante probabilities over output
histories under imperfect information about θ.
2The board of directors of the ﬁrm may, in turn, may delegate the design of the compesation package to a com-
pensation committee. This potentially gives rise to additional incentive problems. Here simplify and assume that the
board decides compensation and its incentives are completely aligned with those of the shareholders.
6Figure 1: Timing of the game and probabilities.


















denote the Bayesian posterior on the probability of θ = G conditional on history yt. The
Bayesian updating is done in the usual way; after observing a high output at time t, the prior over









q(yt)πG +( 1− q(yt))πB
. (2)













with πG > b πG and πB > b πB, and where b q
¡
yt¢
is the posterior under the assumption of low eﬀort,
calculated in the same way as in (2). The probability of each individual period’s outcomes under im-
perfect information about θ depends on the history through the Bayesian updating of the probability
of the good technology. Given our assumptions about the stochastic structure, we can construct the











3 Benchmark: The Optimal Contingent Consumption Scheme
In this section we assume an unlimited set of compensation instruments are available to the board.
This implies that in the optimal contract wages can vary arbitrarily with the history of proﬁtr e a l -
izations. We call this a contingent wage contract, and following the moral hazard literature we refer
to the optimal one as the Second Best (as opposed to the First Best, when eﬀort is observable).
The optimal contract deﬁnes an unrestricted sequence of contingent consumption levels that
minimizes the cost of implementing the high eﬀort level. It is noteworthy that any Options Scheme
naturally puts a lower bound on the available punishments to the agent (he can always choose not to
exercise the options and he incurs no loss). Correspondingly, we assume that there exists a minimum




be the agent’s consumption levels, contingent on the realizations of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts.

































































We also impose the limited liability constraint:
ct (yt) ≥ b ∀yt. (LL)
The model presented here is a variation of the one in Hopenhayn and Jarque (2007). They provide
a characterization of the Second Best contract for a class of stochastic processes that includes the
3Note that u(b) may be interpreted as the CEO’s per period consumption if he were to work elsewhere. Although we





>bis satisﬁed for every y
t.
8one in this paper, but do not consider an explicit lower bound on utility. Our next proposition is
rephrasing their main characterization result under a limited liability constraint.4










Proposition 1 (Characterization of the Second Best) There exists a LR∗ such that:
(i) any history yt with LR
¡
yt¢
≥ LR∗ is assigned the




(ii) for histories with LR
¡
yt¢















Longer histories contain more information, so the dispersion of likelihood ratios and compen-
sation increases over time. In other words, postponing incentives until later periods, when better
information is available, reduces the cost of implementing high eﬀort: it reduces the need to spread
consumption in earlier periods, bringing down the average variance of compensation in the contract.
It follows from the above characterization that only when the likelihood ratio values are monotone
in the outcome of the ﬁrm, is it optimal to have compensation increasing in the performance of the
ﬁrm. When learning about the ﬁrm’s type is possible, this will not always be the case, as indicated
by the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Optimal consumption is not necessarily monotonic in proﬁt.
Proof. See Appendix for a generalization of the proof in Miller(99).
The existence of non-monotonicities comes from combining learning with the provision of incen-
tives. Since the quality of the ﬁrm’s technology is not controllable by the CEO, an ideal contract
would insure him against this risk. However, under such a contract, the manager would shirk and
blame poor performance on a bad technology. The optimal contract demands exposing the agent
to some technology-related risk, which can imply non monotonicities in consumption. The owners
of the ﬁrm evaluate the relative likelihood of eﬀort and learn about the quality of the technology
at the same time. The likelihood ratio of a history consists of the ratio of the probability of the
history if eﬀort is low, divided by the probability if eﬀort is high. A high outcome following low ones
4See Kadan and Swinkels (2006) for a study of the eﬀect of bounds on utility on the optimal contract under moral
hazard.
9may increase the likelihood that previous bad draws were the result of low eﬀort and is thus “bad
news” for the agent. In other words, the weights given to each type’s probability distribution (i.e.,
the posteriors,) are diﬀerent for high and low eﬀorts, so the ordering of each type’s probabilities is
not preserved in the probability unconditional on the type. To clarify, we can think of the following
example:
G B
eL ˆ πG 0
eH πG 0
,
with πG > ˆ πG. In words, output can never be high if the ﬁrm is of the bad type, regardless of the
eﬀort of the agent, but it happens with positive probability if the ﬁrm is good. If the ﬁrst couple
of outcomes are low, the agent is given some compensation taking into account that the ﬁrm might
be of the bad type, so the observed output is quite likely under the high eﬀort level. In the third
period, output can be low or high. If the third outcome is high, then the owners of the ﬁrm know for
sure that they are facing a good type. The whole history is judged now under the new beliefs. If the
third realization is low, the bad type has still positive probability (in fact, it has a higher posterior).
This may mean that the agent’s wage in the second period is lower if we observe a high outcome
than if we observe a low one, since the two ﬁrst low outputs have a much higher likelihood when
knowing that the ﬁrm is good. This sort of learning dynamic is what gives rise to non monotonic
compensation.5
4 Compensating CEO’s with Stock Options
We now introduce a stylized compensation scheme that tries to capture the main features of typical
executive compensation. The compensation instruments that are available to the designers of the
contract are a constant wage c0 to be paid at any period before any option is exercised, and a set of




5In an independent study, Celentani and Loveira (2206) apply this same logic to explain the Relative Performance
Evaluation Puzzle (the documented lack of a negative relationship between CEO compensation and comparative per-
formance measures, such as industry or market performance), as well as the tendency to insulate a CEO’s rewards from
bad luck, but not from good luck
In our model, if we were to allow for economy—wide shocks (i.e., orthogonal to both the quality of the ﬁrm and
the eﬀort of the CEO), the same logic behind Proposition 2 would, for the right parameter values, imply this type of
“puzzling” insurance for the CEO.
10where Tj is the time at which options in the grant j are exercised, nj is the number of stock
options in the grant and zj is the price at which the stock can be bought if the options are exercised.
The ﬁrst thing to notice about this compensation scheme is that, in order for options to be
used as an incentive mechanism, the ﬁrm’s stock price sequence {xt} must be sensitive to proﬁt
realizations. In our model, this dependence comes from learning. Investors, who are the third player
of the game, want to learn about the quality of the technology of the ﬁrm, so they can accurately
price the expected future stream of proﬁts. Given the stochastic structure deﬁned in the previous














The assumptions under this pricing rule are that there is competitive (actuarially fair) pricing in the
Stock Market, and that the market understands that the incentive problem is solved inside the ﬁrm,
so the equilibrium level of eﬀort is the relevant one for calculating the expectations.
Remark 3 Stock prices are always increasing in output (See Appendix).
The timing of the game is as follows: First, the ﬁrm Owners (O) decide on the Options Contract.
Second, nature (N) decides whether the ﬁrm is good or bad, and the manager (M) decides his level
of eﬀort without knowledge of the ﬁrm type. Finally, the ﬁrm proﬁt level is realized conditional on
the choice of eﬀort, and the stockmarket participants (S) price the stock based on their Bayesian
updating of the ﬁrm quality (see Fig. 1).
Note that, if there were no extra noise in the ﬁrm’s outcome, a payment with options would
not be feasible in a pure strategy equilibrium, since the price of the stock would be constant and
independent of the eﬀort level of the CEO. This is in the spirit of Holmström’s inﬂuential paper on
dynamic incentives for managers [8]. Although in Holmström’s setup the manager is not required
to exert a certain level of eﬀort, he is paid in the future based on the beliefs of the market about
his productivity. The manager does not know his own productivity (as the manager in our model
does not know the type of the ﬁrm), but he exerts positive eﬀort in order to increase the probability
of good outcomes, which inﬂuence upwards the beliefs of the market about his productivity, and
hence his future wage. In our model, the pricing rule of the market is independent of the actual
eﬀort exerted, since the market assumes the equilibrium eﬀort is chosen. The manager understands,
however, that lowering his eﬀort would increase the probability of low output, which would drive
downwards the beliefs about the ﬁrm and thus prices. Lower prices would mean, in turn, lower
























Figure 1: Game tree for a given options contract.
In our set-up with learning, we explicitly make the distribution over stock prices depend on the
recommended level of eﬀort: when the CEO is considering a deviation, he understands that prices
are determined under the equilibrium beliefs of the market. As a result, the reduced form probability









The problem of the owners is to choose the Options Scheme that minimizes the cost of imple-
menting the high level of eﬀort.




























∈ argmin{·} K (eH)
b) The utility of the agent choosing eH is higher than if choosing eL, and is as large as his outside
utility U
12c) the pricing function x
¡
yT¢
and the beliefs of the stockmarket participants are consistent with the
agent choosing eH
d) beliefs are updated according to Bayes’ rule
Since the probability of observing any history is positive under the equilibrium level of eﬀort,
Bayesian updating provides consistent beliefs, and no reﬁnement is necessary.
If we allow for a big enough number of available grants H,a td i ﬀerent exercise prices and times,
and we also let n take negative values, the executive compensation package could reproduce any
contract that uses arbitrary consumption transfers.












for all yt, the Second Best
contingent wage contract can be implemented through a multiple stock Options Scheme.
Proof. See Appendix.
To understand this result, recall that the Second Best scheme ranks consumption levels according
to likelihood ratios. If market prices discriminate between any two histories with diﬀerent likelihood
ratios, then there exists enough variation in prices to span the vector of consumption levels implied
by the Second Best scheme.
Real-life options schemes, however, do not include as much variety of options as the above propo-
sition suggests. We do observe changes in salaries and sequential award of diﬀerent options with
several vesting times, but payment schemes including options are fairly simple. As documented by
Murphy (1999) in his analysis of stock options granting practices for 1,000 ﬁrms in 1992, there seems
to be little cross—sectional variation in granting practices. In 83% of the ﬁrms in his sample, all
options expired in 10 years, and in 95% of the ﬁrms they were granted with exercise prices equal to
the “fair market value” on date of grant. A second data source cited by Murphy, a survey conducted
by Towers Perrin in 1997, when asked about the rules used to determine option grants, 40% of the
ﬁrms answered they used a ﬁxed value of the options as a target (adjusting the number of options
according to the market price at the date of the grant), and another 40% answered they used a ﬁxed
number of shares rule. Moreover, the above result may imply negative exercise prices, i.e., payments
from the CEO to the ﬁrm, a practice that is not usually observed in real life.
These empirical regularities make it hard to argue for a level of sophistication as the one suggested
in the previous proposition. Although we do not explicitly model the trade—oﬀ that is behind the
simpliﬁcation of real life option grant awards, in the next sections we restrict to more realistic cases
by restricting the Options Scheme to take a very simple form.
134.1 Analysis of a One Option Grant
In order to gain some analytical insight on the role and determination of the individual instruments
of the scheme, we analyze a payment scheme including only one option grant. A One — Option
Scheme is a vector:
{c0,T,c 1,n,z},
where c0 is the constant consumption for the CEO for every period before the time at which
options are exercised (his base salary); T is the time at which options are exercised, n is the number
of stock options granted (which, for the rest of the paper, is assumed to take only positive values); z
is the price at which the stock can be bought if the options are exercised; and c1 is his consumption
at T without the potential proﬁt from the exercise of the options (his base salary at the time of
exercise).
This scheme is a major simpliﬁcation in several ways. First, all the stock options share the same
exercise time, while in reality we observe that some proportions of the same stock options award
become available for exercise at diﬀerent times. Second, the base wage is constant, whereas usually
stock grants are complemented with bonus plans based on accounting measures. As pointed out by
Holmström (79), any informative signal should be included in an optimal compensation scheme. It is
reasonable to think that the accounting measures in which bonus payments are made contingent on
contain information not included in stock prices, and vice versa. Hence, the coexistence of the two
variable compensation instruments can, in principle, be part of an optimal compensation scheme in
the presence of agency problems. Here, we concentrate on the information contained in stock prices
and the implications it has for the characteristics of option grants. We are assuming for our analysis
that incentives are provided exclusively through option granting. This simple framework allows us to
learn about the trade—oﬀ present in the optimal use of stock options as compensation instruments.
Some properties of a one—option grant can be pointed out right away.
Remark 5 The optimal scheme will always have a positive number of stock options and the exercise
price will be such that the options will be exercised after at least one of the possible histories of proﬁts.
This property is necessary to satisfy the Incentive Constraint when using only a one option grant.6
Note as well that our option grant could have a zero exercise price, so that in fact it would be in the
form of restricted stock.
Remark 6 The consumption of the manager is bounded below, since he always has the right to not
exercise the option if the stock price is below the exercise price.
6If accounting measures are not a suﬃcient statistic for stock prices, however, this would be true even in a more
general compensation scheme including, for example, a bonus program.
14This is, in fact, an important limitation of the design of the contract. It is this fact that motivated
us to include an assumption of limited liability of the CEO in the previous section.
Remark 7 In an Options Scheme, the utility of the CEO is always weakly monotonic in the proﬁt
of the ﬁrm; i.e., after a given history yt, whenever the observation at time t +1i sah i g ho u t c o m e ,
the manager is given higher utility than when the realization is low.
In the payment with options, the designer of the contract is limited to payments that are
spannable by changes in the stock price, after information on the ﬁrm’s output is released. Traders in
t h em a r k e ta r eo n l yt r y i n gt ol e a r na b o u tt h et y p eo ft h eﬁrm, and the eﬀort level is taken to be the
equilibrium one. Hence, as stated in a previous remark, prices are weakly increasing in output. This
is a key departure from the Second Best contract, where under some parameters the new evidence
about the eﬀort level chosen and the ﬁrm type can give rise to non-monotonicities, as established
in Prop. 2. Since the non—monotonic cases are rare, however, for the rest of the analysis in the
paper we rule out the parameter speciﬁcations for which consumption in the optimal contract is non
monotonic in output, unless speciﬁcally noted.
We can split the problem of ﬁnding the optimal One—Option Scheme into two stages. First, we
ﬁnd the values of c0 (T),c 1 (T),n (T) and z (T) that implement the high eﬀo r ta tt h em i n i m u m
cost, for a given T. Given this partial solution, we can then calculate the cost associated with each
T, which we denote by K1 (T). The optimal exercise time is the one with the smaller cost. In order
to keep the notation as simple as possible, denote the possible histories at T by {yi}
2T
i=1 , and their
probability by {pi}
2T
i=1 for the high eﬀort, and {b pi}
2T
i=1 for the low eﬀort. Similarly, denote {xi}
2T
i=1
all the possible stock prices at T. For a given T, let γ0 =
1−βT−1
1−β be the weight of the payments
that occur up to the time T, when the options are exercised. Similarly, γ1 =
βT−1
1−β is the weight of
payments at T.














U ≥ γ0u(c0)+γ1u(c1)F (z)+γ1
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i∈Γ(z)
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≥ γ1u(c1) b F (z)+γ1
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In the second stage of the problem, the optimal exercise time is determined as follows:




0 = c0 (T∗),c ∗
1 = c1 (T∗),n ∗ = n(T∗) and z∗ = z (T∗).
The limitations of the one-option contract with respect to the Second Best are two. On one
hand, consumption can only be made contingent on realizations after time T, and it is constant
before that.7 On the other hand, at time T, the payments are constrained to be history-dependent
in a very speciﬁcw a y :t h e ya r ea na ﬃne function of the diﬀerence between the market price assigned
to the given history and the exercise price. In the Second Best, all the information contained in the
history of realizations is used at each point in time, and consumption depends on the histories in an
arbitrary way.
Both limitations of the Options Scheme would be present, although to a lesser extent, in a more
general compensation scheme including more instruments. We observe a limited number of diﬀerent
vesting times in real life schemes; if these limitations are partially exogenous to the incentive problem
(for example, simplicity needed for transparency concerns, or tax deduction considerations), the
tensions presented here should be present in real life compensation schemes.
In order to analyze the roles of both limitations separately, it is useful to look at a problem which
is constrained in information in the same way as the Options Scheme, but which can determine
contingent consumption at T in an unrestricted way. We refer to this problem as the period—T
optimal contract.
The period—T compensation scheme consists of a constant consumption e c0 to be delivered to the
agent until time e T and a set of contingent consumption levels at time e T,e ci. We can split the problem























U = γ0u(e c0)+γ1
X
i
u(e ci)pi − eH
7The problem could potentially be generalized for a higher number of exercise times. Since we are not modelling
here the trade—oﬀ that would endogenize this variable, we choose to present the simplest case for the analysis.
16eH − eL = γ1
X
i
u(e ci)(pi − b pi)
It is possible to characterize the solution to this problem, which constitutes a useful benchmark for
analyzing the limitations imposed by the aﬃne structure of the options when trying to optimally
allocate consumption over the diﬀerent histories at T. The optimal consumption in the period—T













The intuition for this solution parallels that of the Second Best scheme characterized in Prop. 1:
histories with lower likelihood ratios receive higher payments than histories with high likelihood
ratios, except that here we only look at histories of length T. The spread of consumption levels at
time T and the concavity of the CEO’s utility function determine the constant wage c0, since from










This condition was derived by Rogerson (1985) in a two period repeated moral hazard problem.
Here, it implies that the expected wage of the CEO at the time of exercise will be higher than his
base salary, c0, if the inverse of his marginal utility is concave. It also implies that c0 is always higher
than the lowest consumption established by the contract at T.
The main lesson that we take from this benchmark model is that, ideally, the Options Scheme
would deliver big proﬁts from exercising the options when a history associated with a low likelihood
ratio is realized, while keeping the beneﬁts low (maybe setting a high enough exercise price so the
option cannot be exercised at all) when the corresponding likelihood ratio is high. In the following
subsections, we propose very simple and stylized examples that illustrate the roles of the exercise
time and price, the number of options and the constant consumption, in tailoring incentives to the
likelihood ratios ordering.
4.1.1 Determining the Exercise Time
The main trade—oﬀ that the Options Scheme presents when determining the optimal time of exercise
are mostly all present in the period—T Second Best scheme. Like in the unconstrained case, waiting
longer increases information quality. Higher exercise time means longer histories to base the com-
pensation on, so more extreme values for the likelihood ratios. At the same time, delaying incentives
17is expensive. Delaying means that the same spread in utilities has to be delivered in less periods, so
more variation overall is needed, increasing the risk premium. This requires also a higher constant
wage up to the period when incentives are given, following the intuition in eq.7 — the inverse of the
marginal utility evaluated at c0 equals the expected inverse of the marginal utility of contingent con-
sumption at T. The optimal time of exercise is one for which the marginal beneﬁt from the increase
in information when waiting one more period does not overcome the increase in cost associated with
the higher variability in the continuation utility.
This intuition can be formalized for the period— T scheme. Assume the CEO has utility function
u(c)=2
√
c. Using this functional form, we can ﬁnd explicit solutions for the multipliers of the PC











where vT is the variance of the likelihood ratio distribution at time T.8 Consumption in the optimal




















































. Note that there are two
elements in 8 that depend on T : the weight of payments at the time of exercise, γ1, and vT. Since
γ1 =
βT
1−β, we know γ1 ∈ [0,1] and that it is decreasing in T. This force makes cost increase with
T, and agrees with the intuition that the longer we wait to provide incentives the more variation in
consumption will be necessary to implement high eﬀort; this translates into a higher marginal cost of
incentives, μ, and ultimately in higher cost. The second element that varies with the time of exercise,
vT, could be increasing or decreasing in T. In an i.i.d. output case, this variance can be shown to
8Each possible history at T,yi, has a likelihood ratio associated, LR(yi).The distribution function over the likelihood
ratios is constructed by attaching to each value LR(yi) a probability equal to that of the histories that have it associated.











Figure 2: Example: πB = .6, b πB = .55,πG = .85, b πG = .75,q 0 = .6














Figure 3: Example: πB = .8, b πB = .41,πG = .85, b πG = .45,q 0 = .6
be increasing (see Hopenhayn and Jarque (2006) for details). In the presence of learning, however,
the result does not follow through. Numerical simulations suggest vT will generally be increasing,
although it could be a concave or convex function of time (Fig. 2 and 3 present two examples of these
situations). Assuming vT is always increasing with T, this force goes against the one coming from
γ1. The optimal period —T contract determines e T∗ by balancing the beneﬁts of waiting for richer
information with the cost of delaying incentives.
Another issue associated with the Options Scheme is the ﬁto ft h ep r i c eb e h a v i o ro ft h ep e r i o d
in question with respect to the likelihood ratios of the histories. As we argue in the next subsection,
this will determine the solution for a given exercise time, and thus, will imply diﬀerent costs.
194.1.2 Providing Incentives at T
As mentioned in the above discussion of the period—T model, the choice of the option grant para-
meters is aimed to match low-likelihood-ratios-histories with high proﬁts, and high-likelihood-ratios-
histories with low proﬁts. Recall that we assume that the parameters are such that likelihood ratios
are monotonic in outcomes. As established in Prop. 7, the compensation of the CEO under the Op-
tions Scheme is also monotonic in the outcome of the ﬁrm. Market prices increase with the number
of high realizations because high proﬁts increase the posterior of the good type. As for likelihood
ratios, observing an extra good outcome lowers the likelihood ratio because the probability of a
better history is higher under the high level of eﬀort than under the low eﬀort. The increase of the
price for an extra high realization is not necessarily commensurate to the corresponding decrease in
the likelihood ratio. The problem that the design of the option grant must address is precisely that
of transforming the change in market prices into a change in compensation that matches, as much
as possible, the increase in consumption that the likelihood ratios would recommend.
In our model, prices are determined endogenously; in order to get a clear picture of the role of each
instrument in the mapping from prices to consumption, we construct the simplest possible examples
that capture the eﬀect of the independent behavior of prices and likelihood ratios. In particular,
we take prices to be exogenously and arbitrarily assigned to histories, and we pose two diﬀerent
speciﬁcations for the likelihood ratio structure. In section 4.1.3 we provide some numerical examples
for an optimal one—option grant in which prices are endogenously determined from primitives, and
we corroborate the intuition described in this section.
The following examples show how the use of options with a positive exercise price can sometimes
be more eﬃcient than a simple linear compensation, such as restricted stock grants. For a given
price structure, the number of options granted and the constant consumption c1 aﬀect the change
in consumption for a given increase in market prices: a high n reinforces the increase determined
by the market, while a low one combined with higher c1 forces consumption to be more even across
histories with diﬀerent market prices. The exercise price, however, adds ﬂexibility to the linear
compensation: if likelihood ratios of histories with diﬀerent low market prices are similar, an exercise
price above those prices allows the Options Scheme to set consumption to be equal in those states,
matching closely the optimal incentive scheme. In a linear compensation scheme, this eﬀect could
be achieved only by lowering n, but this would imply a ﬂat proﬁle for all histories. Using the
exercise price, consumption can be ﬂat for histories with low market price without compromising
steep compensation for high prices, which can be achieved by choosing a high n.
20Two Outcome Example Let the possible prices at a given exogenous T be xL and xH, with
xL <x H, and the corresponding probabilities be p and 1 − p. For notational convenience, deﬁne
wi = c1 + nmax{0,(xi − z)}, for i = L,H,
i.e., wi is the implied consumption under the Options Scheme, for a given outcome realization i, at
the time of exercise. The choice of the exercise price inﬂuences the compensation in two ways. First,
it determines the beneﬁt per option exercised, through the diﬀerence (xi − z). Second, it determines
the set of states for which the option is exercised: when z<x L the option is always exercised, while
for xL <z<x ,it is only exercised when the market price is high. As it turns out, the principal is
indiﬀerent between any z ∈ [0,x H).
Proposition 8 For a two-outcome case, the cost of the Options Scheme does not change with the
exercise price, and it is equal to the cost of the period—T optimal scheme.
Proof. In a two outcome scheme, with the three instruments available in the Options Scheme, the
principal can replicate exactly the two consumption levels implied by the period—T optimal scheme.
Any triple {c1,n,z} that solves the system
cL = c1 + n(xL − z)
cH = c1 + n(xH − z)
implements exactly the optimal consumption. Since there is one extra instrument, for any z ∈ [0,x H)
we can ﬁnd c1 and n that give cL and cH.
Three Outcome Example Now let there be three possible prices at a given exogenous T : xL,
xM and xH, with xL <x M <x H, with corresponding probabilities pL,p M and pH summing up
to one (e.g., period 2 in the binomial output case analyzed). Choosing z, we determine the set of
states for which options are exercised. There are three possible cases: z<x L, so options are always
exercised, xL <z<x M ,o rxM <z<x H.
Claim In analyzing the three outcome case, we can restrict attention to prices z ∈ [0,x M].
Proof. We can rule out z ∈ (xM,x H] from the analysis since the cost of the contract for any z in
this interval is the same as the cost for z = xM. To see this, note that when z is in this range the
option is only exercised in the high state, so
wL = wM = c1
wH = c1 + n(xH − z).
21As in the two outcome case analyzed in the previous subsection, the three instruments available let us
span any pair of consumption levels. Since in this rage of possible exercise prices we are constrained
to pool together the low and the medium states, the pair of consumption levels that minimizes the
cost of implementing the high level of eﬀort is the solution to the period—T optimal scheme for a two
outcome case in which the combined state of low and medium happens with probability pL + pM.
The cost minimizing solution for n and c1, for any given z ∈ [xM,x H], is such that it implements
the same wL = wM and wH; thus, the cost of the contract is constant in this range.
We now show, with two examples, that the solution for the optimal z is not trivial. Depending on
the way that likelihood ratios change across outcomes, having a positive exercise price may constitute
a cheaper compensation scheme than having the wage be just a linear function of the ﬁrm’s value.
Example 9 Let pL,p M, b pL and b pM be such that the likelihood ratios of the low and the medium price










Looking at the FOC’s of the three outcome period—T optimal contract, we see that equal likelihood
ratios imply that consumption levels at xL and xM should be equal at the optimum. Take z = xM;
this exercise price equates consumption at the low and medium realizations: wL = wM. In turn, this
reduces the problem to a two outcome problem, and as we saw before, c1 and n are chosen to get
wL = wM = cL = cM and wH = cH. No other Options Scheme can do better than the proposed one.
In this example, any options contract with z<x M would have a higher cost of implementing
high eﬀort. As we see in the next example, however, there exist cases in which the optimal exercise
price is lower.
Example 10 Let pM,p H, b pM and b pH be such that the likelihood ratio of the medium and the high










Assume, by means of contradiction, that z = xM. The IC of the problem can be written as:













As it is evident from this rearrangement of the IC, incentives are given in this case by diﬀerentiating
the expected consumption of the agent in the states in which he exercises the option (whenever the
high or the medium price occur) and consumption in the low realization case, when he only consumes
the constant wage. Deﬁne:
u ≡ pHu(c1 + n(xH − z)) + pMu(c1).
22Consider the following deviation: set a lower price of exercise z = xL and decrease the number of
o p t i o n sg r a n t e da sm u c ha sn e e d e ds ot h a tt h ee x p e c t e du t i l i t yd e l i v e r e dt ot h ea g e n tw h e n e v e rh e
exercises the option stays equal to u. C a l lt h i sn e wn u m b e ro fo p t i o n sn0:
pHu
¡




c1 + n0 (xM − xL)
¢
= u.
For a given c1 this change in z and n does not aﬀect the PC and the IC:
U = u + pLu(c1) − eH













As for the cost of this alternative payment scheme, we can show that it is lower than the one with
z = xM. B yl o w e r i n gt h ee x e r c i s ep r i c et h es c h e m ei ss h i f t i n gc o n s u m p t i o nf r o mt h eh i g hr e a l i z a t i o n
to the medium. As it is obvious form the deﬁnition of u and by the concavity of the utility function of
the agent, marginal utility of consumption is higher in the medium state than in the high one. This
implies that, under the more even distribution of utility implied by the pair z = xL and n0, the cost
in terms of consumption of achieving u is lower. This implies that z = xM could never be optimal.9
In light of the second example, the intuition for the high exercise price in the ﬁrst example follows
the same logic. In that case, the likelihood ratios of the ﬁrst two observations are equal, so they
should be grouped in the same interval, either in the exercise set or in the no exercise set. Given
that they are the two lowest values, the optimal contract makes them both part of the non-exercising
set. In this case, any z<x M would introduce a diﬀerence in consumption between the two states,
making more expensive the delivery of the necessary average utility, as established by the incentive
problem. This is what drives the exercise price up. More generally, these examples suggest that
when likelihood ratios are a decreasing but concave function of the stock price, the exercise price
should be higher; when they are convex, the exercise price should be lower. We will return to this
point as we examine numerical results below.
9In fact, for a non empty set of parameter values the optimale x e r c i s ep r i c ec a nb ez e r o .I no r d e rt os a t i s f yt h eI C
and the PC with z =0the new number of options n













00pL ≥ 0 since there is a nonnegativity (more generally, a limited liability) constraint on consumption. Small
pL relative to pM, very concave utility functions, small
b πL
πL or πM >> πH all favor exercise prices close to zero, since
they make c1 − n
00pL ≥ 0 slacker.
234.1.3 Numerical Examples
The analysis of the previous subsections looked at changes in the choice for T, or for z, for given
values of the other variables, prices and likelihood ratios. With the results of that partial analysis in
mind we go back to the one—option grant and use numerical examples to illustrate that the intuition
p r o v i d e db yo u rp r e v i o u sa n a l y s i sp r e v a i l sw h e nd e r i v i n g{c0,T,c 1,n,z} jointly as the outcome of
the cost minimization problem in 5. To corroborate the intuition derived from those examples, we
consider cases in which the graph of likelihood ratios as a function of stock prices has a concave or
a convex shape. The parameters used in these examples are given in Table 4.1.3.
T β U eH eL πG πB b πG b πB
9 .96 .85 3 2.5 .8 .4 .6 .3
Parameters used in the numerical examples.
In our ﬁr s te x a m p l ew es e tt h ep r i o rq0 = .9.10 The speciﬁcation of the parameters satisﬁes the
MLRP, so the Second Best scheme is monotonic in the number of high outcomes of the history. The
o p t i m a lt i m eo fe x e r c i s ei sT =8 . In Figure 4 we graph the likelihood ratio of the nine possible
histories at period 8 with respect to their corresponding market prices. Prices are monotonic in
output, so the lowest corresponds to a history of eight low outcomes and the highest to one of eight
high outcomes. The exercise price is 14.1, in between the ﬁfth and fourth highest market prices. It
is clearly at the high end of possible stock prices. Notice that, as in example 9, likelihood ratios are
concave almost everywhere with respect to stock prices.
Now consider the same numerical example with a diﬀerent prior for the good state, q0 = .5 instead
of q0 =0 .9. The optimal time of exercise is period 6. When we graph the likelihood ratio of each
of the possible histories at T =6against the market prices, in ﬁgure 5, we observe that the curve
is now convex for the most part. The optimal exercise price (z =8 .5) is very close to the second
lowest market price, so the options are exercised almost in every state. This conﬁrms our previous
intuition: the exercise price is higher in the concave case and lower in the convex one.
It is interesting to examine why this change in priors aﬀects in such a way the shape of the like-
lihood ratios function. The change in prior induces a change in both the likelihood ratios associated
with each outcome and in market prices. When the prior changes the relative importance of the
learning eﬀect and the eﬀort eﬀect (how the likelihood ratio changes with observations) changes. In
an extreme case with no learning about the type of the ﬁrm, the likelihood ratio would vary and
the market price would take only one value: the graph would be a vertical line. If, instead, the
10Solution: c0 =1 .2227, n =2 .5436,z=14.0776, T =8 .















Figure 4: Likelihood ratios plotted against stock prices and the optimal exercise price (q0 =0 .9).










Figure 5: Likelihood ratios plotted against stock prices and the optimal exercise price (q0 =0 .5).
25probabilities were equal across eﬀorts in both states, there would be no learning about the eﬀort and
the graph would be a ﬂat line. In between cases determines the ﬁnal shape of the graph of likelihood
ratios against prices.
In our example, the relative importance of the two eﬀects is determined by the value of the prior.
For example, take a low price market of the ﬁrm; if the history was to have an extra high realization,
for the case of q0 =0 .9 that would imply a strong learning eﬀect that would drive prices up. Note
that lowering the posterior equivalent to giving more weight in the likelihood ratio to the probabilities
of the bad type of the ﬁrm (πG =0.4, b πG =0 .2); for these probabilities, the informational content
about eﬀort of the CEO is weaker than for the bad type (πB =0.7, b πB =0 .6), since the likelihood
ratio of the good outcome is the same in both states but it is much higher for the bad outcome in
the good state.
Recall that optimal consumption in the period—T optimal contract is ordered according to like-
lihood ratios. For simplicity consider the case of logarithmic utility, for which consumption in the










The ﬁnal consumption of the agent under the Options Scheme, although it tries to replicate the
optimal scheme deﬁned by the ordering and values of the likelihood ratio, is constrained to be












the Options Scheme can prevent that the increase in prices translates into higher consumption of the
C E Ob ys e t t i n gah i g he n o u g he x e r c i s ep r i c e .T h i si mplies that, in our numerical example, when the
prior decreases the optimal options contract should, ﬁrst, reward lower prices (lower exercise price),
and second, lower the diﬀerence in consumption among the high states (lower n). The ﬁrst point is
due to the fact that now low outcomes are not associated with such large likelihood ratios, and at the
same time the ratio of the increase in market price due to an extra high outcome for a poor history
with respect to a high history is lower under the low prior; the two eﬀects reinforce each other. As
for the second point, prices under the lower prior are more diﬀerent for histories that are similar in
terms of their likelihood ratio (good histories), so the sensitivity of consumption to changes in prices
(n) should be lower.
4.2 Optimal Option Scheme: a Two Period Example
The analysis of compensation schemes containing options in the previous sections was limited to
schemes including only one option grant; this provides with a clear understanding of the role of each
26of the elements in an option grant. Ultimately, we would like to derive the best possible compensation
scheme using as many options as needed, and then evaluate its performance against the Second Best.
Although ﬁnding the optimal option scheme this is a complicated problem in general, in this section
we study a two period version of our problem and we provide an example in which the Second Best
contract can be implemented though option grants. Moreover, we examples in which a negative
exercise price is necessary to provide incentives in an eﬃcient manner.
Assume the CEO has u(c)=2
√
c and T =2 .D e n o t eb yp1 the probability of the high outcome
in the ﬁrst period:
p1 =P r 1 (yH|eH)
b p1 =P r 1 (yH|eL).
Denote the prior over the good type as q0, and the posterior following realization yi as q1i. Denote
the second period probability by
p2i =P r 2 (yH|yi,e H)
b p2i =P r 2 (yH|yi,e L).
First, we ﬁnd the Second Best scheme, to then show the implementation through options. For
simplicity, assume no discounting and also that the limited liability constraint does not bind. The
solution to the two period problem of the principal is characterized in Prop. 1. From the First Order











where v1 and v2 are the variances of the likelihood ratios in period 1 and 2, correspondingly. Using
these expressions we can get the optimal consumption assigned by the Second Best contract to each
history. We can see the solution graphically for a numerical example.11 In Fig. 6 the pairs (pL,c L)
and (pH,c H) are plotted, corresponding to the ﬁrst period.
It is easy to see that a simple restricted stock grant, combined with a base salary, implement
exactly the Second Best consumption in the ﬁrst period. Let the base salary in the ﬁrst period be
denoted by c1, the number of option grants by n1 and the corresponding exercise price by z1. Let
c1 = cL
11Parameters: U = 100,e H =1 0 ,e L =0 , b πB = .1, πB = .65, b πG = .75, πG = .85,q 0 = .6. Solution: cL =2 ,6851,
cH =3 ,1304,c LL =1 ,8060,c HL = cLH =3 ,0577,c HH =3 ,1508. Stock prices: xL =0 .7283,x H =0 .7825,
xLL =0 .6932,x HL = xLH =0 .7413,x HH =0 .7939.

























In Fig. 7 the pairs (pLL,c LL), (pLH,c LH) and (pH,c H) are plotted, corresponding to the second pe-
riod. The plot highlights the concavity of the compensation scheme, which is diﬃcult to reproduce by
granting restricted stock alone, which would imply a constant sensitivity of compensation to output.
Using a combination of stock options, however, we can implement the Second Best consumption.
Let the salary in the second period be c2 = cLL. Let one option grant consist of n21 options, at an










Other patterns for consumption and prices correlations may arise in which implementation of the
Second Best is only possible using negative exercise prices, as indicated in Prop. 4. In Fig. 8 we
present an example of a concave graph; the optimal options scheme will involve a negative exercise
price for options exercisable if pHH is realized.
In Fig. 9 we plot an example in which the optimal consumption is not monotonic in stock
prices; again, an exact implementation of the optimal scheme violates the limited liability of CEO’s.
In this case, it is clear that an imperfect implementation through and option scheme that equates
consumption in the LL and the LH states, and then provides exactly cHH in the HH state, will



















Figure 7: Example: convex graph of consumption and prices.

















Figure 8: Example: (pLL,c LL), (pLH,c LH) and (pH,c H)















Figure 9: Example: non monotonic graph of consumption and prices.
29implement high eﬀort at a lower cost than a restricted stock scheme that is constraint to strictly
increasing compensations. From our analysis of a two period problem we conclude that the intuition
derived in the one-option example is still useful in the more general options scheme.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper studies the form of contracts used to solve the incentive problem between CEO’s and
the owners of a ﬁrm due to the unobservability of the manager’s actions. We provide an innovative
framework to evaluate the decentralization of CEO compensation through stock; we model the long
lasting eﬀects of CEO’s actions and we derive the eﬀect of eﬀort on stock prices from primitives.
Eﬀort aﬀects directly the conditional distribution of proﬁts, and not the distribution of prices.
In this setup we are able to analyze the extent to which Options Schemes can be a good approxi-
mation to an optimal contract with unrestricted contingent consumption. In order for options to be
used as an incentive mechanism, the price sequence for the stock of the ﬁrm {xt} must be sensitive
to proﬁt realizations, and thus to the eﬀort of the CEO. In our model, we assume that buyers in the
stock market understand that the owners of the ﬁrm design the compensation of the CEO in order
to provide him with incentives to choose the right eﬀort; under this assumption, the dependence of
prices on proﬁts comes only from learning about the quality of the technology of the ﬁrm through
time. This points out the main characteristic of compensation schemes that include stock options:
the link between eﬀort and payoﬀ is indirect and can make the use of options a more expensive way
of providing incentives.
From the analysis of the optimal Options Scheme we conclude that there exist situations in which
a compensation scheme including options with a positive exercise price performs better in terms of
cost that a simple linear contract, i.e. a payment in the form of restricted stock. One example of
these situations is when, for a low price market of the ﬁrm, the arrival of good news has a strong
learning eﬀect that drives prices up; if the informational content about eﬀort of the CEO is not as
strong, the Options Scheme can prevent this increase in prices to translate into higher consumption
of the CEO by setting a high enough exercise price. On the other hand, the main drawback of using
options is the concentration of incentives in time; setting a high exercise time constitutes a simple
way of making the compensation of the manager contingent on better information, but it can raise
the cost of the payment scheme due to the higher volatility of compensation needed to implement
the high cost action. Big rewards are a consequence of the use of simple Options Schemes instead of
more complicated wage contracts that incorporate all information available at each point in time.
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2(Generalization of Miller 1999) The ﬁrst order conditions of the problem
say:
c(yi)=λ + μ(1 − LR(yi)) i = L,H
Proof. We have that
LR(yL)=
q0 (1 − b πG)+( 1− q0)(1− b πB)
q0 (1 − πG)+( 1− q0)(1− πB)
LR(yH)=
q0b πG +( 1− q0)b πB
q0πG +( 1− q0)πB
Since
πG > b πG
πB > b πB,
we ﬁnd that, as in the standard moral hazard problem, consumption in the ﬁrst period is monotonic
in the outcome:
LR(yL) >L R(yH) ⇒ c(yL) <c(yH).
















. To simplify the notation, let p and b p be the













1 − b p
1 − p
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= sign(p − b p).















































































































































































(πB − b πB)































have to check the conditions under which the eﬀect of learning will overcome the standard MLRP
eﬀect.
Remark: Stock prices are always increasing in output.
34Proof. Given the assumptions about the conditional distribution of proﬁt, a good outcome is










































(πG − πB) > 0.








.F r o mt h e
PC of the problem, the utility of the CEO is an increasing function of market prices.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3The Second Best contingent consumption scheme can be thought of as a
set of vectors, one for each period:





, − → c 2 =
⎡







⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
, ..., − → c t =
⎡










⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
The dimension of the consumption vector at each t equals 2t; let this dimension be denoted by
d(t). We need the Options Scheme to span any point in Rd(t).D e n o t ea swt (·) the consumption
of the CEO under the Options Scheme at time t and following a history with a given yt.I t



















The set of vectors of consumption spannable with the multiple Options Scheme will be:
h




































































⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
.
35For the result to hold, we need the rank of the matrix of payoﬀse q u a lt od(t). For each t,
order the market prices from lowest to biggest, where xi <x i for i =1 ,...,d(t).L e tzt,1 =0 ,
and zt,i =
xi+xi−1
2 . The resulting matrix will be
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣






























⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
.
Given the construction of the prices, the matrix becomes:
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
x1 x2 x3 ... x d
0 x2−x1
2 x3 − x1+x2
2 ... x d − x1+x2
2
00 x3−x2











⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
,
which is diagonal and thus of full rank. We can always ﬁnd (nt,1,...,n t,t+1)
T
t=1 so that − → w t = − → c t
∀t.
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